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ABSTRACT 
 Although Islamist lone wolf terrorism seems to be defined by its very 
randomness, the actors themselves can be predictable. This thesis examines four case 
studies of seemingly disparate terrorist attacks conducted by Islamist lone wolf actors and 
identifies seven specific commonalities that contribute to an increased potential for self-
radicalization. Furthermore, it examines stochastic violence in the context of 21st century 
jihad. Today the lone wolf is the weapon of the stochastic terrorist. 
 The four case studies are 1) Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, 2016; 2) Soldier 
Readiness Processing Center, Fort Hood, Texas, 2009; 3) Bastille Day, Nice, France, 
2016; and 4) San Bernardino, California, 2015. 
 The seven commonalities are 1) engrossment in radical messaging/propaganda on 
the internet; 2) first- or second-generation immigrant; 3) reduction of personal 
effects/finances; 4) affinity with extremist group(s); 5) rapid shift in beliefs or mosque 
attendance; 6) withdrawal from, or absence of, family/friends/romantic relationships; and 
7) sexuality (repression or guilt). 
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Although Islamist lone wolf terrorism seems to be defined by its very randomness, 
the actors themselves can be predictable. This thesis examines four case studies of 
seemingly disparate terrorist attacks conducted by Islamist lone wolf actors and identifies 
seven specific commonalities that contribute to an increased potential for self-
radicalization. Furthermore, it examines stochastic violence in the context of twenty-first 
century jihad. Today, the lone wolf is the weapon of the stochastic terrorist. Stochastic is a 
mathematical term of probability which identifies something as both random and 
predictable (in that the occurrence is indeed probable). As global jihadist groups 
increasingly struggle for relevancy and attempt to maintain a global reach, they turn 
progressively towards stochastic violence as a method to keep the movement alive. By 
creating a “wiki-narrative” that weaves these acts together into a seemingly interconnected 
web, terrorist organizations can create a perception of strength and unity otherwise 
nonexistent.1      
In 2004, Syrian-born al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri published a 1,600-page 
manifesto titled The Global Islamic Resistance Call. In this work al-Suri proposes the 
concept of individual jihad or, jihad fardi, as one of multiple recommended means to keep 
the jihadist movement alive amidst increasing pressure from global counterterrorism 
efforts. Now, following the collapse of ISIS’s physical caliphate, it is likely that stochastic 
violence in the form of jihad fardi will increasingly become a favored modus operandi for 
Islamist terrorist organizations. Groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) have become prime enablers of this stochastic violence by circulating incendiary 
messages calling for individual violent action. Who chooses to act is ostensibly random; 
however, the likelihood that someone will act is probable and therefore predictable. By 
identifying the commonalities between those who choose to act, we can in fact make the 
actors more predictable as well.  
 
1 Glenn E. Robinson, Global Jihad: A Brief History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021), 
139. 
2 
Researchers often study lone wolf terrorism in the context of the phenomenon writ 
large, placing equal emphasis on lone wolves of all ideologies. This approach creates 
certain gaps within the existing literature, and it is this theme of examining lone wolf 
terrorism so broadly that this study addresses. While it is true that one may find similarities 
across all classifications of terrorists, it is equally true that it is more effective to compare 
like ideologies. While apples and oranges are both fruit, we are better rewarded by 
comparing apples to other apples. Therefore, this study narrows the aperture of analysis to 
only those lone wolves who identify as jihadists. 
In existing literature there is often disagreement on the definition of what 
constitutes a lone wolf terrorist attack. For example Jeffrey Simon organizes case studies 
within what he believes are the five categories of lone wolf terrorists: secular, religious, 
single-issue, idiosyncratic, and criminal, comparing them all equally (despite most 
mainstream scholars disagreeing with the ‘criminal terrorist’ characterization).2  Ramon 
Spaaij likewise regards a lone wolf as anyone “who acts out of a strong political, 
ideological, or religious conviction, carefully plans his or her actions, and may successfully 
hide his or her operations from those around them.”3 Both collate and compare lone wolves 
of all ideologies looking for similarities, thus comparing apples to oranges (and pears, etc.). 
For this thesis we define the Islamist lone wolf as an individual, without formal connection 
to a terrorist organization, who perpetrates violence under the guise of Islam in an 
ostensible attempt to connect to the greater global jihad movement. It is by using this 
narrow categorization that we identify factors which may assist in the preemptive 
identification of those with a propensity to become agents of stochastic terror. We are, in 
effect, identifying rotten apples within the orchard.  
 
2 Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat (Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2016), 43–46. 
3 Ramón Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention, 
SpringerBriefs in Criminology (New York: Springer, 2012), 17. 
3 
II. WHO ARE THE LONE WOLVES? 
Although it is difficult and perhaps impossible to develop a profile for all lone wolf 
jihadists, based on our research, it is possible to identify indicators of their likely 
radicalization. An accepted model for identifying commonalities amongst all lone wolf 
terrorists both pre- and post-9/11 (through 2017) can be seen in Table 1.4 This 
representation is rather broad and represents lone wolf terrorism writ large, though it holds 
relatively true for the jihadist subset.  
Table 1. Commonalities amongst All Lone Wolves5 
Variable % of Pre-9/11 Cases % of Post 9/11 Cases 
Personal/political grievances 80 80 
Affinity with extremist group 63 48 
Enabler  57 70 
Broadcasting intent 84 70 
Triggering event  84 73 
 
To develop a more useful model we examined four case studies of lone wolf jihadist 
attacks and inspired stochastic violence to codify key indicators of the radicalization 
process. Each case was selected for evaluation based on the seemingly disparate nature of 
attack and attacker. The case studies selected for analysis are as follows 
A. ORLANDO 
Around 2:00 am on June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen murdered 49 people and injured 
53 more inside the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Mateen was not particularly 
religious—at least not for most of his life—but as a violent, maladjusted outsider, he did 
identify with and have an affinity for radical Islamist groups from a young age. It was no 
coincidence Mateen chose to attack a gay night club. He was an angry, sexually confused, 
 
4 Mark S. Hamm and R. F. J. Spaaij, The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism, Studies in Transgression (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 151. 
5 Hamm and Spaaij, The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 151. 
4 
disillusioned young man, looking to make sense of his life.  Stochastic terrorism may only 
require a confused individual looking to connect personal acts of violence to the “wiki-
narrative” of global jihad. In many ways, the massacre at the Pulse nightclub was twenty-
first century jihad, precisely as al-Suri prescribed. 
B. FORT HOOD 
On the afternoon of November 5, 2009, MAJ Nidal Hasan, an officer and 
psychiatrist in the U.S. Army, walked into the Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) Center 
at Ft. Hood, Texas. Shortly after 1 p.m. Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar,” and opened fire. 
MAJ Hasan’s intent was to kill as many American Soldiers as possible before sacrificing 
his own life as (what he considered) a martyr. Before he was severely wounded by 
responding law enforcement officers, Hasan had killed 13 and wounded 32. Hasan survived 
the attack, was tried, convicted of premeditated murder, and sentenced to death. 
Subsequently, much has been made of Nidal Hasan’s connection to radical ideologue 
Anwar al-Awlaki, but contrary to widely held belief, Nidal Hasan had already self-
radicalized prior to reaching out by email (with little success) to Awlaki in 2008–2009.6 
C. NICE 
On the evening of July 14, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a recently 
radicalized French citizen of Tunisian origin, drove a 19-ton cargo truck into a crowd of 
revelers who were celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France. The ensuing carnage resulted 
in 86 deaths and 458 injuries. The Nice attack was a terrifying example of low-tech jihad 
executed with devastating effect. During the attack Bouhlel was shot dead by police and, 
although ISIS claimed responsibility for inspiring the attack, there is yet to be any evidence 
directly linking him to the organization. However, his self-radicalization and affinity for 
extremist organizations remains clear and undeniable.  
 
6 Much has been made of Hasan’s connection to Awlaki, but Hasan was clearly radicalized before 
reaching out to him in Yemen. Their relationship is further examined in section V-B.  
5 
D. SAN BERNARDINO 
On the morning of December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik 
dropped their six-month-old child off at their parents’ house and proceeded to commit what 
was at the time the worst terror attack in the U.S. since September 11, 2001. At the end of 
their rampage, fourteen were dead and twenty-two lay wounded. After an hours-long chase 
by law enforcement and final shootout, both were killed by police. 
Each individual examined generally conformed to the above model (Table 1). 
However, the model itself proves difficult for predictive analysis and is rather elementary. 
A more accurate predictive model should identify social, societal, and environmental 
factors which seem to indicate a propensity for radicalization and lone wolf type behavior. 
The analysis of these specific (and recent) lone wolf attacks identified certain 
commonalities. While some common traits are clearly anecdotal or problematic for our 
purposes from a civil liberties perspective (ex. travel to Saudi Arabia, or exercising Second 
Amendment rights), most indeed proved useful for development of a more refined model. 
Specifically, we propose seven characteristics or behaviors with which most lone wolf 
jihadists will likely conform, shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Commonalities amongst Islamic Lone Wolves 
Variable % present within case studies 
Engrossment in radical messaging/propaganda on the 
internet 
100 
First or second-generation immigrant 100 
Reduction of personal effects/finances 100 
Affinity with extremist group(s) 100 
Rapid shift in beliefs or Mosque attendance 75 
Withdrawal from, or absence of family/friends/
romantic relationships 
75 
Sexuality (repression or guilt) 75 
 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest these seven distinct characteristics will 
typify the preponderance of lone wolf jihadists. This is not to say that everyone who 
displays these indicators will radicalize to the point of violence, but that most who 
6 
radicalize to violence will display a combination of these indicators. We therefore begin to 
gain an impression of the commonalities between attackers as well as how seemingly 
unrelated environmental factors contribute. But to understand the Islamist lone wolf, we 
must first examine the evolution of Islamist terrorism from an organizationally based 
model to system-based model relying on networks and narratives for survival. 
7 
III. 21ST CENTURY JIHAD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
David C. Rapoport contends that terrorist activity has occurred in four distinct 
waves.7 According to Rapoport, the first wave was comprised of the anarchist movement 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by the Anti-Colonial Wave 
of the 1920s, which was then eclipsed by the New Left Wave of the 1960s. The fourth 
wave, in which the world still finds itself, is the Religious Wave. It should be of little 
surprise to suggest that the most influential and problematic faction within the Religious 
Wave has been the global jihadist movement.  
Glenn Robinson suggests that the global jihad movement had in itself four distinct 
waves. Beginning in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the first wave lasted 
until roughly 1990. The second wave, whose main ideologue was Usama Bin Laden 
(UBL), focused on attacking America in a “far enemy” strategy designed to erode 
American support for “apostate regimes” throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  
Subsequently the third wave was characterized by the emergence of ISIS and that 
organization’s territorial expansion. Finally, and of most interest to this study is the fourth 
wave, or the “Personal Jihad” wave. According to Robinson, this fourth wave of global 
jihad is best encapsulated by (and largely a product of) the teachings of radical Islamic 
ideologue Mustafa Bin Abd al-Qadir Setmarium Nasar, better known by his nom de 
guerre—Abu Musab al-Suri.8  It is in this “Fourth Wave of the Fourth Wave” in which we 
currently find ourselves, where radical ideology is now dangerously enhanced by 
information technology.  
Although most would consider advances in global communications a net positive, 
violent extremist organizations (VEOs), including global jihadists, have manipulated these 
 
7 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy, ed. A.K. Cronin and J.M. Lodes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 
46–73. 
8 Glenn E. Robinson, “The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979–2017,” Middle East Policy XXIV, no. 
No. 3 (Fall 2017): 70–88. 
8 
technologies to their own ends. During the last two decades, the teachings of Abu Musab 
al-Suri combined serendipitously with increased global internet access to enable a 
dangerous intersection of medieval ideology and information age technology. ISIS 
capitalized on these technological advances to realize Suri’s ambitions. Jihadist ideologues 
such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the individual behind the nom 
de plume Abu Bakr Naji are most often credited with the rise of ISIS, but it was the model 
set forth by Suri, made real through a new form of cyber warfare that most contributed to 
the organization’s meteoric rise, catastrophic fall, and enduring legacy. 
B. THE ARCHITECT  
American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki has been credited as the Bin Laden of the 
internet and continues to be the most important ideologue to the English-speaking world. 
Seminal in the popularization of stochastic terror, Awlaki was, as Abdel Atwan writes, “the 
first to suggest exploiting social networking platforms to spread jihadist material.”9 
However, it was the musings of a different radical thinker who has most strategically 
influenced terrorism in the information age. In 2004, a new kind of jihad was introduced 
within extremist circles by the Syrian al-Qaeda strategist, Abu Musab al-Suri. Later in that 
year, Suri published a 1,600-page manifesto, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, which 
has since served as inspiration for a new generation of technology-obsessed jihadists. The 
manifesto was also, uncoincidentally, primarily distributed online, and has subsequently 
become the de-facto “how to” manual for global jihad in the information age. 
In his call to arms, Suri proposed a bifurcated strategy for the future of holy war. 
Generally speaking, the two branches of this vision consisted of an individual jihad, or 
jihad fardi, which would redefine global terrorism, and a collective “open front jihad,” 
which would provide physical room for a caliphate to be established (when the right 
conditions were met). The internet, and the advent of social media specifically, would 
prove critical to both. As Brynjar Lia describes in his biography of al-Suri aptly titled 
Architect of Global Jihad, “Al-Suri’s ability to present operational doctrines is appreciated 
 
9 Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate (Oakland, California: University of 
California Press, 2015), 17. 
9 
(by jihadists), as are his writings about ‘individual terrorism’ by loners or self-sustained 
independent cells.…[Suri is a] non-conventional writer whose perspectives represent a 
fresh approach to jihadi warfare.”10 As we will see, Suri’s concepts proved unconventional, 
innovative, and quite transformative for jihadist warfare. In fact, I would argue that this 
methodology, specifically as it pertains to individual responsibilities, represents the new 
face of global jihad and likely the most significant (or at least most probable) terroristic 
threat for the future.  
Abu Musab al-Suri was born Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nassar in 
Aleppo, Syria, in 1958. He is unique amongst jihadi ideologues due both to his vision and 
capacity to be critical of strategic and tactical errors within the movement. Lia accurately 
describes al-Suri as “a dissident, a critic, and an intellectual in an ideological current in 
which one would expect to find obedience rather than dissent, conformity rather than self-
criticism.”11 Make no mistake, Suri was no apologist; he was a devout true-believer and 
cold-blooded killer, but he was also pragmatic, intelligent, contemplative, and an 
exceptionally prolific writer. It is precisely these characteristics which also make him so 
fascinating.  
It may be erroneous to characterize al-Suri as a true al-Qaeda member — he was 
very much a free agent, and no great friend of UBL. After swearing allegiance, or bay’a, 
to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, Suri was quite censorious of the 9/11 attacks 
on America. He rightly predicted the United States’ reaction would spell doom for the 
Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and to a large extent al-Qaeda central. Suri was 
equally critical of Bin Laden’s proclivity to ignore the directives of Mullah Omar.12  Suri, 
unlike Bin Laden, understood that the United States’ military and intelligence apparatus 
would likely dismantle the cellular network of al-Qaeda in relatively short measure and 
wreak absolute havoc upon the Taliban’s conventional military capabilities. With 
 
10 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 11. 
11 Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, 3. 
12 UBL had also pledged bay’a to Omar. 
10 
seemingly little ego (unlike UBL), Suri focused on realistic expectations, and a strategic 
outlook which could best affect the world as it was, not as he wished it to be. 
Suri was also well-travelled. Following his early life in Syria, he lived in Spain 
(where he acquired citizenship and a Spanish bride), Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United 
Kingdom, where he resided in London for three years. Although he was present for the 
Soviet-Afghan war and has been linked to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, Suri’s seminal 
contribution to the global jihad effort was not as a fighter or commander—it was as an 
intellectual. In fact, Abu Musab al-Suri may well be regarded as the most influential jihadi 
strategist of the last fifty years. Recognized as such by the United States, Suri had a $5 
million bounty on his head by 2005.13  On October 31, 2005, Pakistani intelligence 
officers, with support from the U.S., conducted a raid on the al-Madina Utilities Store in 
the Goualmandi district of Quetta, Pakistan. After a short but brisk gun fight which left at 
least one dead, Abu Musab al-Suri was finally detained by Pakistani authorities. 
C. SURI’S METHODOLOGY 
Despite his capture in Pakistan in 2005, Suri continues to be widely recognized as 
the architect of a global form of jihad reliant on information technology to achieve the 
desired effects.14 Although Awlaki has been more accessible to the English-speaking 
world, and as we shall see, strikingly influential to Islamist lone wolves, it is likely that 
Awlaki himself drew inspiration from Suri. Suri remains a visionary for global jihad across 
all languages, but certainly principal amongst Arabic speakers. His vision took on new 
meaning as adherents, explicitly the Islamic State, attempted to realize his unique 
imagining of a global jihad coordinated across the World Wide Web.  
Perhaps Suri’s most enduring contribution was his call for a restructuring of the 
organizational model most prevalent amongst jihadist groups. Seeing the vulnerabilities 
inherent in a cellular but hierarchical network, Suri prescribed something altogether new. 
Suri’s model, which he termed “nizam, la tanzim,” or “system, not organization,” 
 
13 Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, 1. 
14 Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, 5–7. 
11 
eschewed any form of line-and-block organizational chart in favor of a diffuse and 
decentralized global movement linked only by ideology, shared aims, and narrative. The 
central tenet of this system was the ability to inspire adherents to pursue personal or 
individual acts of violence (jihad fardi).  
To Suri, individual jihad was a new take on an old idea — self-radicalized sleeper 
cells. Although sleeper cells were hardly a revolutionary idea within jihadist circles, Suri 
added a new twist: his sleepers would be decentralized and leaderless, linked only by 
ideology, and in many cases, the internet. This self-radicalized form of terror was unique 
because it required little support from the parent organization other than inspiration, which 
could easily be provided both online and through the media at large. More importantly, it 
provided a very effective way to infiltrate jihadis into the West — it would simply enlist 
those who were already there, with no need to support them logistically.  
Although their radicalization would be covert and clandestine, their attacks would 
be overt and spectacular, as was the case in the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting in which 
a self-radicalized American citizen left 49 dead and another 53 wounded after pledging 
allegiance to ISIS.15  What Suri proposed was what the media would eventually popularize 
as the lone wolf attack. By following Suri’s blueprint of jihad, major militant groups such 
as al-Qaeda and ISIS became much like corporate headquarters, willing to export their 
brand to any group or individual enterprising enough to open a local franchise. This 
symbiotic relationship proved beneficial to all parties. For the parent organizations it 
provided desired publicity; for the aspiring franchisees it provided what they sought most: 
a semblance of legitimacy and fame. In the subsequent chapters we will examine in-depth 
how this model has violently played out across the world stage, enabled by information 
technologies. 
 
15 P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, Likewar: The Weaponization of Social Media (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, an Eamon Dolan Book, 2018), 153. 
12 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
13 
IV. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO 
LONE WOLF JIHADISM 
The very nature of a lone wolf makes it difficult to preemptively identify 
personality or lifestyle risk factors, as they are often isolated from society. But lone wolves 
have much more exposure to society in cyberspace than they do in real life. Unlike their 
personal lives where they are often isolated for some social or personality driven reason, 
online they can find throngs of like-minded individuals with similar mental and situational 
outlooks. These loners make up for their lack of real-life social contact by spending 
exorbitant amounts of time cyber chatting, watching online videos, and reading 
propaganda, all at a rate and volume not possible in the material world. Often, they have a 
large social network: a giant echo chamber of the people they cannot find in real life. The 
people whose views are not socially acceptable gather online to hype each other up and 
confirm their own biases. As Antinori states, the online “ego-system” is creating the 
world’s first global criminal phenomenon.16 
Specifically, since the advent of ISIS, cyberspace and lone wolves are inseparable, 
with the new face of individual jihad requiring the internet to prosecute its global campaign. 
As stated earlier, even disparate attacks share commonalities, and that is certainly true for 
the attacker’s cyber footprint. 
The ability of social media, and the greater online environment, to put visually 
compelling narratives of jihadi propaganda at the fingertips of unlimited recruits represents 
a manifestation of Suri’s teachings. Today’s youth can be easily influenced online by peers, 
mentors, self-described authority figures, or just random strangers “promoting the 
appealing, persuasive and seductive power” of jihad fardi.17  The younger generations 
seem more susceptible to online influence for numerous reasons. They simply spend a 
 
16 Arije Antinori, “The ‘Jihadi Wolf’ Threat: The Evolution of Terror Narratives Between the Cyber-
Social Ecosystem and Self-Radicalization ‘Ego-System,’,” in 1st European Counter Terrorism Centre 
(ECTC) November 4, 2007. 
17 Antinori, “The ‘Jihadi Wolf’ Threat: The Evolution of Terror Narratives Between the Cyber-Social 
Ecosystem and Self-Radicalization ‘Ego-System,’.” 
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larger amount of time online, so just as advertisers have shifted focus away from radio and 
newspapers towards clickbait ads, so too have extremists sought prospective consumers 
online. Technology itself has advanced to the point that extremists can create high quality 
propaganda very quickly to capitalize on real world events in real time, making their 
message more topical and relatable to online consumers. 
The ubiquity of social media and cyber coverage led Antinori to argue that we can’t 
look at cyber as a separate piece of the lone jihad; it is so intertwined and critical that 
without it, this stage of global jihad would not even be possible.18  This new evolution of 
internet jihadism also seems to break down the differences between groups like AQ and 
ISIS in favor of a more jihadist cultural state of mind.19  In other words, today’s youth do 
not need to strictly believe in or adhere to a specific version of the ideology, they just need 
to want to belong to a group. Glenn Robinson refers to this as a “bumper-sticker version” 
of the ideology.20  Recruits do not need a deep understanding of true Islam; they just need 
enthusiasm and some grievances sparked by misleading stories purporting to be from the 
Koran. This is aggravated by the adeptness of online propagandizers in portraying 
individual jihadism in sleek, sexy, online short clips. It is safe to say jihadi propagandists 
are maximizing technology and an understanding of how today’s youth consume 
information to target the most vulnerable in the population and indoctrinate them from 
thousands of miles away to fight in the name of global jihad. 
Antinori breaks online radicalization into two branches:  the cyber ecosystem and 
the cyber ego-system. The ecosystem branch is characterized by “social radicalization 
across social media platforms,” while the ego-system is “mobile radicalization” in terms 
of cyber-social isolation and self-radicalization.21  The ecosystem is easier for law 
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21 Antinori, “The ‘Jihadi Wolf’ Threat: The Evolution of Terror Narratives Between the Cyber-Social 
Ecosystem and Self-Radicalization ‘Ego-System.’” 
15 
enforcement to track, as they are usually open membership YouTube or Telegram 
channels, or ISIS personalities openly broadcasting on Twitter and Facebook. Law 
enforcement can join these groups and watch for indicators. The ego-system on the other 
hand, is more difficult to identify. It may be a true loner, just hopping from one belief to 
the next looking for belonging. It may be someone trying to find the intellectual and moral 
spark to push them over the edge.  
According to Winter, ISIS has outsourced both production and dissemination of its 
content. They unofficially enlist tech savvy influencers to peddle online propaganda with 
minimal effort from ISIS HQ.22  This further exacerbates the lone wolf problem, as any 
influencer can put their specific spin on ISIS media to their legion of fans, who by nature 
are already predisposed to believing and following anything emanating from their 
influencer of choice. It also makes the content very personal. Rather than coming from a 
place thousands of miles away in a foreign language, its coming from the same person or 
network from which they receive amusing pop culture memes. 
To further support this point, Fisher sites a blurring of the delineation between 
content producers and disseminators, resulting in a “user-curated Swarmcast.”  He 
identifies three key components of the Swarmcast:  speed, agility, and resilience.23  All 
three of these traits make it more difficult for law enforcement to target and identify lone 
wolves and their recruiters. Fisher also identifies how ISIS uses a complex network of 
accounts on social media to ensure survivability. Even if a few accounts are stopped by 
law enforcement, there are plenty of backups which would already be in their follower’s 
networks, continuing the online radicalization without missing a beat.24  This dispersion 
in network intrusion is critical to reaching lone wolves, as they may not initially be 
following a “mainstream” network but may have their curiosity piqued by some tangential 
post on an unrelated network.  
 
22 Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” 
STRATCOM COE, accessed February 16, 2020, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/charlie-winter-virtual-
caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy. 
23 Ali Fisher, “How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 9, no. 3 (June 19, 2015): 4, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/426. 
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Winter also believes social media is today’s “radical mosque.”  While social media 
is rarely the actual reason someone becomes radicalized, it is generally the biggest catalyst 
in their radicalization.25  Meaning that while people certainly get their blood boiling on 
Twitter and Facebook, lone wolves don’t radicalize simply because of this action. The 
actual reason is often complex and personal. However, once the radicalization process has 
begun, social media assumes an outsized role.  
But it is not just open source mass social media like Twitter and YouTube that 
contribute to the phenomenon. Encrypted messaging apps like Telegram are increasingly 
becoming part of the toolset. Shehabat, Mitew, and Alzoubi show that much like in broader 
social media, ISIS powers down and distributes their messaging power to anyone friendly 
to the cause. This allows hundreds or thousands of users to create their own encrypted 
messaging channels to create and share ISIS propaganda. Since it is easier to evade law 
enforcement on these apps, they become one stop shops for recruiting, radicalizing, 
directing, and in general ISIS hyping.26  The authors contend that encrypted apps are 
specifically correlated to the rise in Islamist lone wolf attacks in the West. ISIS Telegram 
channels are littered with instructions on how to be a lone wolf, and critically, how to leave 
a pledge to ISIS when you commit the act.27  That is a critical component of Suri’s 
prescription—loosely connected self-radicalized cells conducting attacks in the name of 
the movement. 
The United Cyber Caliphate Telegram channel may be the best example of ISIS’s 
desire to inspire lone wolves online. They have posted alleged addresses of U.S. service 
members, motivational propaganda, and very slick photos urging lone wolf action against 
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Westerns.28  Especially as the physical caliphate is destroyed, the importance of the cyber-
caliphate and its message increases. 
Given the saturation of the 24-hour news cycle, Antinori believes the news media 
can become not only a means but also an ends unto themselves.29  The act itself may have 
had a low effect, but by perpetually sensationalizing the act, the terror effect is magnified 
beyond what the lone wolf could have ever achieved himself. Likewise, Silva and Capellan 
assert that lone wolf attacks get a disproportionately higher news coverage than similar 
mass shooting style attacks. This inundation of information over a singular, sometimes 
small-scale incident, not only increases the public’s perception of the risk of lone wolves, 
but also increases the perceived reward for a lone wolf to act. We have seen time and again 
lone wolves post manifestos or just farewell social media posts prior to their attack; they 
feed off the attention they know they will get for the act. They will become immortalized 
as martyrs for the cause, receiving the attention they never received in life. To make matters 
worse, the non-stop news coverage of these events tends to vilify not just the offender 
(which is reasonable), but also the type of person the offender was.30  In the case of Islamist 
lone wolves, these would generally be young Arab men in Western countries. This 
increased vilification of an entire subset of the population is an amazing grievance for 
terrorist recruiters to exploit. Given the lone wolf’s tendency to “externalize blame,” what 
better recruiting tool than to say, “the reason your life isn’t fulfilled is because of the non-
believers persecuting you.”31 
In 2012, the Swedish Defense Research Agency (SDRA) noted that lone wolves 
leave a digital fingerprint, but that at the time natural language processing, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence were not advanced enough to scour the reaches of the 
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internet and help law enforcement.32  As of 2020, we are getting closer to this ability. The 
SDRA also correctly notes that it is rather difficult to differentiate between lone wolves 
and random people on the internet with extreme views.33  While it very easy in hindsight 
to identify all potential indicators of extremist online activity, catching these indicators 
prior to the act is generally a stroke of luck at best, or impossible at worst. The lone wolves 
tend to follow the same steps and post similar content, but given the expanse of the internet, 
this is generally not feasible to catch. But if law enforcement started with a list of potential 
lone wolves, based on the earlier discussed traits and indicators, then it could thin the search 
to focus on potential suspects.  
Applying today’s techniques in text mining, affect analysis, natural language 
processing, and machine learning to various extremist messaging apps and online forums 
could greatly assist law enforcement (LE) in thinning the herd of potential lone wolves, 
and focusing limited assets. The SDRA suggests such an approach for lone wolves and 
extremists generally, but this approach requires refinement and specialization to be 
effective.34  Given the difference in terminology and techniques for Islamist lone wolves 
versus lone wolves in general, law enforcement would need to properly classify training 
data specific to Islamists, and then likely employ a supervised learning technique. This will 
initially be fairly resource intensive. However, assuming a static jihadist approach to 
recruiting and propaganda, LE could deploy this new tool across the wide range of 
modalities used by the jihadist recruiter. In other words, once the tool is developed, LE 
could use it relatively uniformly on Telegram, Facebook, YouTube, and any number of 
online forums catering to the jihadists. 
The importance of social media and the greater online jihadi community in 
inspiring lone wolf attacks cannot be overstated. As Weimann shows, most recent lone 
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wolf attacks have relied on social media for everything from radicalization and how-to 
instructions, to praise and post attack propaganda.35   
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V. THE CASE STUDIES 
To connect the dots between these cases, our methodology is to examine each 
within the context of four categories or bands. These bands will provide both continuity 
between cases as well as a unique method to identify key similarities between attackers. 
The four categories of analysis are: early life and education, family and social connections, 
path traveled to radicalization, and tipping point. This is followed by a discussion of the 
warning signs exhibited preceding the attacks as well as those identified subsequently. As 
with the homicidal triad, the authors of this thesis propose that by codifying warning signs 
we will offer an increased opportunity to preemptively identify those with an inclination 
towards self-radicalization. 
A. THE PULSE MASSACRE, TERROR OR HATE: AN IN-DEPTH 
ANALYSIS OF OMAR MATEEN 
1. Early Life and Education 
By most accounts, Omar Mateen was a bad kid. He was suspended from school 
numerous times, and records of his poor behavior go back to at least the third grade. He 
was disruptive in class, combative, forced to switch schools due to behavioral issues, and 
eventually dropped out. In interviews after the massacre, former classmates described him 
as a “jerk” and said that he “got on everybody’s nerves.”  Shortly after September 11, 2001, 
Mateen was suspended for allegedly celebrating the attacks.36 At the time though, much 
of his radical rhetoric was viewed merely as a play for attention and ignored by school 
administrators, likely for fear of appearing Islamophobic. 
School records show Mateen was a below average student with distracting 
behavioral issues.37 One school administrator claimed Mateen’s father would never take 
the claims seriously and always sided with Omar.38  He displayed a propensity to use 
 
36 “Records: Orlando Gunman Talked about Violence in 3rd Grade,” Seattle Times, June 17, 2016, 
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shocking tactics to garner attention and often invoked extremist organizations—he was 
once reprimanded for imitating a burning plane after 9/11. Yet law enforcement took little 
interest.  
2. Family and Social Connections 
Mateen’s poor behavior seems to have continued into his adult life. He married his 
first wife in 2009, only to separate after four months due to his physical abusiveness. 
Shortly thereafter he married again, and yet again was alleged to have abused his wife. 
During his second marriage, he also allegedly stalked a local female bartender.39 
Aside from the woes of his personal life, Mateen also had issues in his professional 
life. He attempted to become a law enforcement officer in Florida, only to be dismissed 
from training for remarks about bringing a weapon to work after the Virginia Tech 
shootings in 2007. He later found work with a private security company, G4S, where he 
dubiously passed a personality test falsely signed by a physician who did not work for the 
company. G4S later admitted the test was blessed off by a physician with close ties to the 
Mateen family.40  He was removed from his first posting with G4S after he claimed he 
would “have al-Qaeda kill” a fellow security guard. Mateen claimed he said this in 
retaliation for coworkers’ racist remarks. There exists no evidence indicating any actual 
relationship between Mateen and AQ, but as in imitating a burning plane after 9/11, he 
clearly displayed an affinity for jihadist groups—even if just for shock value. 
Mateen’s father left Afghanistan in the 1980s and Omar was born in the U.S. Like 
many lone wolves, Omar was a first-generation immigrant. Mateen’s father hosted a 
satellite political TV show where he often criticized the Pakistani and Afghan 
governments.41  His actual political stance is described by Picart as “incoherent,” but he 
had allegedly “disavowed Jihadi affiliation.”  Friends reported that the “Mateen children 
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feared any link to Islamic extremism.”42  This would manifest when Mateen’s father 
allegedly slapped Omar for making comments that seemed to support the 9/11 attacks. 
3. Path to Radicalization 
Given the comparative ambiguity and confliction regarding Mateen’s motives, his 
case study provides a unique insight into how Americans ascribe motivations based on 
political leanings. As Noor et al., found, groups with different beliefs were more likely to 
try to ascribe Mateen’s motives to something which fit their narrative.43  National security 
hawks believed he was a terrorist, social justice activists were more apt to claim he was 
anti-LGBTQ, while others blamed mental illness. Mateen seems to have been a self-
loathing, anti-social, repressed homosexual, with an affinity to falling back on extremist 
organizations to create fear and shock value. He certainly suffered from some level of 
mental illness, yet he was just as likely acting out on his repressed sexual identity by 
attacking the LGBTQ community. And what better way to seek legitimacy (and headlines) 
than pledging allegiance to ISIS in the process, though adequate evidence exists to show a 
genuine modicum of radicalization and a growing level of fundamentalist beliefs.   
He was placed on the FBI’s terrorist watchlist when he was investigated regarding 
comments made to coworkers during his brief stint as a security guard.44  He repeatedly 
boasted about connections to al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS (despite 
these groups divergent ideologies). He also became engrossed in the online sermons of 
Anwar al-Awlaki. His second wife would later claim in court that he was an avid reader of 
online extremist sites.45  Mateen was again investigated by the FBI, this time regarding his 
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connection with a member of his mosque who travelled to Syria to carry out a suicide attack 
for al-Nusra.46  Weeks before his own attack Omar attempted to buy body armor and bulk 
ammo, but was turned away by the shop owners, who alerted the FBI.47  In aggregate, 
these events paint an obvious picture, yet the dots were never connected in a meaningful 
way.  
4. Tipping Point 
A true tipping point in Mateen’s life is not immediately clear—though he claimed 
it was the death of ISIS commander Abu Wahib by a U.S. airstrike in Iraq. He was fired as 
a corrections officer trainee, but he quickly took another job in private security. His first 
marriage ended after a few months, but he quickly remarried. Following the attack at Pulse, 
numerous survivors claimed to have seen Mateen in the club multiple times in the weeks 
and months leading up to the attack, and this may have been reconnaissance, sexual 
exploration, or both. He was known to have used gay dating apps, yet no evidence exists 
of him having consummated any homosexual relationships, although this is not outside the 
realm of possibility. While it is possible, as noted, these actions were indicative of stalking 
prey in preparation, it is as likely they indicate a man attempting to come to grips with his 
own sexuality—yet unable to reconcile this reality with his belief system. 
During the shooting, Mateen called 911 multiple times. In these calls he pledged 
allegiance to ISIS and referred to himself as “mujahideen (sic)”48 and “soldier of god.”  He 
spoke to a crisis negotiator and told him to “tell America to stop bombing Syria and Iraq,” 
and that “too many innocent people were dying because of U.S. strikes.”  He claimed his 
motivation for the attack was to “stop the U.S. air strikes.”  Specifically, he claimed the 
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May 6, 2016 strike on ISIS commander Abu Wahib was the impetus for his actions. He 
cited the Boston Marathon bombers and the Paris, France attackers as well.49 
Mateen’s true tipping point, it appears, was his inability to reconcile his sexual 
identity with his growing religiosity. In a seemingly odd, yet alarmingly common paradox, 
it is also quite likely that his increased religiosity was directly related to his inability to 
accept his sexual identity.  
B. THE INFILTRATION OF FORT HOOD:  AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF 
MAJ NIDAL HASAN 
1. Early Life and Education 
Nidal Malik Hasan was born into a Palestinian immigrant family in Arlington 
County, Virginia on September 8, 1970. The Hasan family made all attempts to assimilate 
into American society being relatively secularized and “more ‘culturally’ Muslim than 
actively engaged in the religion.”50 Nidal’s parents ran a few small businesses in Northern 
Virginia. His childhood was one of relative security and comfort. While in high school 
little distinguished Hasan from any other students. In fact, as Katherine Poppe asserts 
“[Hasan was] an unremarkable student who left few impressions on those around him.”51 
There is no evidence that young Nidal was subjected to discrimination or school yard 
bullying due to his ethnicity or religion. Indeed, there is no evidence that Nidal Hasan’s 
radicalization began at an early age. If anything stands out regarding this period of Hasan’s 
life, it is his introversion marked by a noted absence of friends or social connections outside 
of his immediate family unit. 
Following high school graduation, Hasan enlisted in the U.S. Army and was 
assigned to the National Training Center (NTC) in California. Hasan’s performance as an 
enlisted soldier was also completely unremarkable. He was not subjected to any abuse or 
discrimination (except that which all young soldiers experience as a matter of discipline) 
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while assigned to NTC.52  Though only an average student, Hasan was later accepted into 
Virginia Tech University. He graduated in 1997 with a bachelor’s degree in biochemistry 
and was subsequently accepted into medical school for psychiatry at the Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). Completion of the program at 
USUHS would incur an additional military service obligation, which he seems to have 
desired. It was only during his follow-on internship and residency at Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center that Hasan would begin to show some troubling signs. 
As we will see in later discussion there were clear signs of deepening religious 
intensity beginning with the death of his mother in 2001. However, there is a difference 
between increased religiosity and radicalization. In 2003, Nidal Hasan began his internship 
and residency at Walter Reed and it is here that we identify the most concrete examples of 
his burgeoning radicalism. Hasan began to display a pattern of “increased isolation from 
family and colleagues, growing religious conservatism, and the adoption of views typically 
associated with jihadi-Salafism.”53  While at Walter Reed “Hasan failed to develop any 
close relationships...[and] according to interviews with his former colleagues, Hasan would 
never socialize outside of the classroom.”54  It was apparent that Hasan was becoming 
intentionally distant. In a TIME Magazine article one of Hasan’s classmates relates “[he] 
wore his rigid Islamic ideology on his sleeve…  He would be standing there in uniform 
pledging allegiance to the Koran.”55  During this time Hasan was also noted as asserting 
that Shari’a law transcended the Constitution of the United States and advocated for the 
legitimacy of suicide bombers.56  Perhaps more concerning was a series of presentations 
which Hasan would give as a part of his residency requirements. 
Hasan used his presentation periods as opportunities to lecture his classmates on 
his belief that the war on terror was a war on Islam. It is however, two projects from the 
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2007–2008 time period that most stand out. In presentations titled “The Koranic 
Worldview as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military” and “Religious Conflicts among 
U.S. Muslim Soldiers,” Hasan clearly outlined his beliefs that the United States was 
directly attacking Islam, and that Muslim soldiers facing religious conflicts should be 
allowed to administratively separate or occupy non-combat positions, lest Muslim soldiers 
participate in what he termed “adverse events.”57  He was by this point an unstable and 
conflicted man who tried unsuccessfully to gain conscientious objector status or 
administrative separation from the military.58  Hasan received orders to report to Ft. Hood, 
Texas in the summer of 2009. His colleagues would soon receive an education regarding 
exactly what he meant in his presentations by “adverse events.”   
2. Family and Social Connections 
As previously noted, Nidal Hasan was a consummate loner. He seems to have had 
very few social connections other than his immediate family, which he eventually alienated 
with his increasingly extreme religious views. It is likely that Hasan initially was a harmless 
and insecure introvert, but as is often the case with maladjusted young men who find social 
interaction difficult, antisocialism became his defining characteristic. Gradually as time 
passed, we can imagine that Hasan blamed others for his social failings and eventually lost 
any impetus to establish a relationship with anything other than his god. While this is 
conjecture, what is certain is that Hasan had no discernable romantic relationships with 
either women or men throughout his entire life. His social circle was nonexistent, and so 
was his support structure.  
Perhaps Nidal Hasan’s most noteworthy and defining relationship was with his 
mother who died of cancer in 2001. As her caretaker thought her battle with the disease, 
Hasan was profoundly affected. Hasan’s family was not particularly devout, but tragedy 
can often push people deeper into their faith for comfort and this is precisely what 
happened. Only for Hasan, it was not comfort he found, but rather fear. As he grew more 
religious, he also grew increasingly concerned about his mother’s fate in the afterlife. He 
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quite literally believed his mother was in jeopardy of spending an eternity in hell, and this 
fear led to his journey of religious intensification.59  
Much has been made of Hasan’s relationship with the radical al-Qaeda cleric 
Anwar al-Awlaki. In fact, al-Awlaki presided over Hasan’s mother’s funeral at the Dar al-
Hijra mosque in Virginia. It is clear that al-Awlaki made an impact on Hasan, however in 
the years to come when Hasan attempted to contact al-Awlaki (in Yemen), he was largely 
unsuccessful.60  Katharine Poppe, writing for the George Washington University Program 
on Extremism states: “Hasan’s emails to Awlaki, written between December 2008 and June 
2009, are commonly mentioned by scholars in discussions regarding Hasan’s case. Based 
on emerging evidence, however, these emails are a symptom, not the cause, of Hasan’s 
radicalization.”61  It seems that although al-Awlaki was clearly influential, Hasan was well 
on his path to radicalization before trying to re-establish contact with his former Imam. 
3. Path to Radicalization 
Nidal Hasan’s path to radicalization was relatively straight forward. From his 
period of religious intensification beginning in 2001 through its eventual manifestation at 
Ft. Hood in 2009, there was no wavering or detours. The process likely began with the 
death of his mother and his renewed interest in Islam. His religious intensification was soon 
followed by a period of growing anger and frustration with what Hasan viewed as a United 
States led war against Islam. Beginning in 2003, Hasan became enamored with internet 
videos of sermons by al-Awlaki, leading to numerous attempts to contact him in Yemen 
for guidance. There is, however, no evidence that al-Awlaki played any part in planning or 
directing the attack at Ft. Hood. His assertions in presentations at Walter Reed betrayed a 
belief that violence was justified against the U.S. government by Muslims well before he 
corresponded with any known terrorist organizations. It is quite likely that Hasan was 
considering a violent episode against the U.S. government as early as 2006–2007, when 
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his conscientious objector status was denied along with a request for administrative 
separation. At this point it seems, all he needed was a spark to set him to action.  
4. Tipping Point 
Nidal Hasan’s trigger seems to be when he learned that he would deploy to 
Afghanistan. This occurred in October 2009 (roughly one month before the attack). Since 
his arrival at Ft. Hood, Hasan had kept little in the way of personal possessions and began 
donating approximately three-quarters of his income to Islamic charities.62 In August, 
Hasan purchased the FN 5–7 pistol he used in the attack and began to spend significant 
time at a shooting range.  When he received deployment orders, it served as his impetus to 
act. By the first week of November his plan to assault the SRP center was complete, chosen 
for its concentration of unarmed and unwary American soldiers.  
C. BY ANY MEANS AVAILABLE:  AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF 
MOHAMED LAHOUAIEJ-BOUHLEL 
1. Early Life and Education 
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was born on January 3, 1985 in M’saken, a minor 
city of less than 100,000 inhabitants near Tunisia’s Mediterranean coast. While little has 
been documented regarding his adolescent life, what does emerge is a grainy image of an 
angry, maladjusted youth with a propensity for violence from a very young age. His 
psychologist recalled from a meeting in 2004, that there existed “the beginnings of 
psychosis,” and that Bouhlel wasn’t “living in the real world.”63  He is described by his 
family as having been an excellent student in high school despite his fragile mental state 
and was not particularly religious.64  Throughout his life he was known to have sexual 
relationships with both women and men as well as a penchant for drug and alcohol abuse. 
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It is worth noting that M’saken, Bouhlel’s childhood home, is in a region of Tunisia that 
later became known as a jihadist hot bed. M’saken is adjacent to Sousse, where in 2015, a 
jihadist gunman killed 38 people during a terror attack on a tourist resort. This attack was 
the deadliest terror attack (by a non-state actor) in Tunisian history. Though living in Nice 
at the time of the attack, Bouhlel was almost certainly initially exposed to jihadist ideology 
as a youth living in M’saken, Tunisia. 
2. Family and Social Connections 
Bouhlel had a tumultuous relationship with his family from an early age. As a 
youth, and indeed throughout his entire life, he was subject to violent outbursts, and marked 
depression. By the age of 16, Bouhlel’s parents were so frightened of him that he was 
kicked out of the family home.65  He began seeing a mental health professional at the age 
of 19 following a mental breakdown, and was prescribed antipsychotics, antidepressants, 
and tranquilizers, though these seem to have had no lasting effect.66  
He relocated to Nice in 2005 and in 2009 married a French-Tunisian cousin. 
Together they had three children. Exploitation of his media devices following the attack 
indicate numerous extramarital affairs, including one with a 73-year-old man.67  According 
to the BBC, a French prosecutor described his sex life as “wild,” and goes on to reference 
a lifestyle marked by drugs, alcohol, and abuse.68  His marriage was also turbulent, and by 
2016 he had been estranged from his wife for over two years amid accusations of domestic 
violence. By most accounts Bouhlel comes across as a sexually confused, philandering 
loner with very few meaningful relationships. His aggressive nature estranged him from 
his immediate family and his propensity for violence wreaked havoc on his marriage. In 
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the months preceding the attack Bouhlel would further alienate himself from his non-
familial social circle by his growing fascination with violent jihadist propaganda.  
3. Path to Radicalization 
Despite numerous arrests for petty crime “[F]rench authorities never opened a 
security file on Bouhlel because he had no known ties to any terrorist or jihadist group.”69 
His capacity for violence was well known, yet few would have noticed his burgeoning 
radicalization. In 2016, the Associated Press published an account from Bouhlel’s uncle 
claiming that his nephew had been in contact with an ISIS recruiter approximately two-
weeks prior to the attack, but this claim remains unsubstantiated.70  Existing evidence 
points to this being very unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out. What is certain is that in the 
weeks or perhaps months leading up to the attack, he fell increasingly prey to ISIS’s most 
effective messenger—the internet. Friends maintained that Bouhlel became enamored with 
violent extremist videos on the internet, especially ISIS beheadings. Due to his increasingly 
radical beliefs, he began to distance himself from those who did not share his new ideology 
and thus spent more time with those who shared his beliefs. Again, it is unknown how 
much his new acquaintances contributed to his radicalization, but at least five provided 
varying degrees of support for his attack plans and were subsequently arrested for 
conspiracy. 
Bouhlel clearly suffered from mental illness, likely undiagnosed borderline 
personality disorder. In his life of increasing chaos, it is plausible that he sought something 
to provide balance and meaning, and thus turned to Islam. It seems that Bouhlel hit a 
breaking point in his personal life and turned to religion, and it is also likely that his fragile 
mental state left him very susceptible to rapid and extreme radicalization. If this is the case, 
he would not have needed a physical recruiter. He was sexually confused and emotionally 
unbalanced; he had a tumultuous upbringing and unstable family life; he suffered from a 
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poor self-image and body dysmorphia—all these factors combined to create an individual 
already groomed for violent radicalization, and ISIS’s message provided the necessary 
impetus for action. Indeed, French radicalization expert Dounia Bouzar claims this 
psychological profile is all too common amongst extremists.71  Like many others who 
radicalize and seek martyrdom, it is quite likely that Mohamad Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was 
attempting to atone for his sins and seek forgiveness. 
4. Tipping Point 
The tipping point was simply opportunity. The Bastille Day celebration on the 
Promenade des Anglais in Nice draws thousands of revelers to a very condensed 
thoroughfare creating a perfect kill zone. Bouhlel identified a national celebration and a 
method of execution to inflict maximum casualties and garner significant media attention. 
He used his credentials as a delivery driver as an effective cover for status, and the pretense 
of delivering ice cream to the celebration as a cover for action. Interrogation of his mobile 
phone indicated numerous photographs detailing his reconnaissance efforts during the 
preceding 48-hours, but it is likely that the attack was well planned months in advance.  
D. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE WITH A JIHADI TWIST: AN IN-DEPTH 
ANALYSIS OF SYED RIZWAN FAROOK AND TASHFEEN MALIK 
1. Early Life and Education 
Syed Rizwan Farook was a second-generation American born of Pakistani parents. 
While it is alleged that his childhood home was abusive and troubled, Farook graduated 
from high school a year early and then went on to graduate from California State 
University-San Bernardino with a bachelor’s degree.72  He appeared to be normal as an 
adult, with a dating app profile listing target practice as a hobby and being described by 
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coworkers as “pleasant.”73  He was described as a devout Muslim, often attending prayers 
twice a day at the local mosque. He did however keep his distance from the rest of the 
mosque goers, and he allegedly stopped attending once he married Tashfeen Malik.74  He 
also traveled to Saudi Arabia several times, including to complete the hajj.75  There appears 
to be conflicting reports on whether his family knew the true depth of his radicalization, 
and how complicit they were in the attacks. While none of the ascribed traits in themselves 
are noteworthy, nor should they be the impetus for elevated law enforcement suspicions in 
the U.S., they are indicators that the local community could be on the watch for. This local 
community is the imam, mosque congregants, and his family in this case, but could be 
translated to any social group of any ideology that is susceptible to extremist tendencies. 
Tashfeen Malik was born in Pakistan and spent most of her life between there and 
Saudi Arabia. She attended a strict women-only religious school while in Saudi Arabia. 
This school allegedly teaches hard line Salafist interpretations of Islam and caters to 
women from more well-off and influential families.76  Prior to that, she attended 
pharmacology school in Pakistan, graduating in 2012.77  In early 2014, Farook traveled to 
Saudi Arabia to see Malik after they met on the internet. Shortly thereafter she entered the 
U.S. on a fiancé visa and underwent the requisite security interviews and database searches 
to get a green card.78  In the years prior to the attack, she was reported to have become 
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very religious, to the point of radicalization. She adopted very hard line views of Islam, 
and her family said she left their moderate Islam for her perverted version while in Saudi 
Arabia.79  Malik, as a Muslim woman, is a very rare type of mass shooter terrorist, 
especially because she may have been the more important driving force behind the attacks. 
2. Family and Social Connections 
Farook’s brother, Raheel Farook, served in the U.S. Navy and deployed twice to 
Iraq.80  He appears to have been a normal outgoing citizen, compared to his brother who 
was often described as an introvert or anti-social.81  Raheel was later implicated in, and 
pled guilty to, a conspiracy to commit immigration fraud by lying about the sham marriage 
of his wife’s sister and one of Farook’s friends, Enrique Marquez. 
Malik’s father, according to her uncle, had adopted a more hardline version of Islam 
once he moved the family to Saudi Arabia. This may be where Malik’s journey started 
before delving deeper into Salafism in her schooling. 
Farook and Malik lived by or with Farook’s family. They had very close 
relationships with his mother and his brother. Just like in Omar Mateen’s case, law 
enforcement attempted to make a case that there is no way the family did not know of the 
pending plans. While they might not have known the exact details, it is hard to believe they 
were oblivious. But just as there is difficulty identifying a member of your community as 
a threat, singling out a member of your family to law enforcement is often unlikely. 
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3. Path to Radicalization 
The two appeared to be planning the attack for a few years prior (perhaps even prior 
to being engaged).82  In fact, they seem to have begun radicalizing before they even met, 
and before ISIS’s propaganda started to sweep the world.83  It remains difficult to 
determine exactly which group or version of the ideology specifically contributed to their 
radicalization, and if they would have acted had ISIS not been gaining power and 
popularity. As with other such terrorists, it did not matter if they had an affiliation with the 
group, ISIS would declare them soldiers of the caliphate to keep building their brand and 
to spin more propaganda. 
Regardless, the couple had clearly radicalized and were planning a violent event 
for some time. They amassed thousands of rounds of pistol and rifle ammunition, as well 
as various bomb making materials.84  As far back as 2011, authorities allege Farook was 
planning to conduct terror attacks in San Bernardino with a neighbor and converted 
Muslim, Enrique Marquez. Marquez would later plead guilty to charges stemming from 
his part in acquiring the weapons Farook and Malik would later use.85  This also appears 
to be when Farook began intensively exploring extremist material, as it is alleged he and 
Marquez would spend hours engrossed in Inspire and online speeches from Anwar al-
Awlaki.86 
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A couple weeks prior to the attack, Farook took out a $28k loan, and then 
transferred roughly $10k to his mother’s account. He also made another $10k transfer, 
which authorities initially believed may be payment for the rifles used in the assault.87 
4. Tipping Point 
The last straw was likely Farook’s forced attendance at an office Christmas party. 
On her social media, Malik expressed displeasure that Farook would have to attend this 
non-Muslim holiday party.88  It was at this party that Farook and Malik would ultimately 
orchestrate their attack. 
Each of the individuals in the above case studies traveled their own unique paths to 
radicalization. Yet they share significant similarities. As we shall see, connections can be 
made across cases to develop a useful profile for identification of at-risk individuals.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN? 
From the analysis of four case studies we have extrapolated seven factors shared 
between individuals and events across time and space which could prove most useful in 
preemptive identification (Table 3). The first five factors are present in every case and 
should be considered primary indicators. The subsequent two factors were present in 75% 
of cases studied and appear to have a high correlation to radicalization. Also, due to their 
sociological nature they are particularly interesting. Collectively, any combination of 
factors is cause for concern, but it is worth noting the fewest indicators observed in any 
individual case was 5 out of 7 (Farook and Malik). Nidal Hasan, Mohamed Lahouaiej-
Bouhlel, and Omar Mateen each displayed all seven indicators.   
Table 3. Commonalities per Case Study 
Variable Mateen        Hasan       Bouhlel       Farook/Malik 
Engrossment in radical messaging / 
propaganda on the internet 
X X X X 
First or second-generation immigrant X X X X 
Reduction of personal effects / finances X X X X 
Affinity with extremist group(s) X X X X 
Rapid shift in beliefs / mosque 
attendance 
X X X X 
Withdrawal from, or absence of family 
/ friends / romantic relationships 
X X X  
Sexuality (repression or guilt) X X X  
 
A. ENGROSSMENT IN RADICAL MESSAGING / PROPAGANDA ON THE 
INTERNET 
Possibly the best predictive indicator for a burgeoning lone wolf is internet activity. 
This should be of little surprise given the internet is the most effective means for the 
stochastic terrorist to cast a wide net. In fact, AQAP’s digital magazine Inspire is 
practically dedicated to it. Scholars point this out as well, as noted by Raffaelo Pantucci 
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The internet is clearly the running theme between most of the plots included 
in this dataset [of lone wolf terrorists] and it appears to be a very effective 
tool: it provides a locus in which they [lone wolves] can obtain radicalizing 
material, training materials and videos. It provides them with direct access 
to a community of like-minded individuals around the world with whom 
they can connect and, in some cases, can provide them with further 
instigation and direction to carry out activities. Many of the individuals in 
the dataset demonstrate some level of social alienation—within this context, 
the community provided by the internet can act as a replacement social 
environment that they are unable to locate in the real world around them.89  
This behavior is predominant in all four case studies. Mateen investigated extremist 
literature online every day for months prior to his attack, and like Bouhlel, became 
enamored with ISIS’s execution videos. Hasan likewise became so engaged with the online 
sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki that he ultimately attempted to contact him in Yemen. Law 
enforcement alleges Farook was engrossed in online propaganda as far back as 2011. His 
online interests featured AQAP’s digital Inspire magazine and a multitude of Anwar al-
Awlaki’s sermons. From their private conversations it is evident Farook and Malik were 
talking about jihad and extremism very early in their courtship, but as the FBI stressed, 
these were private messages, not publicly available on their social media, so law 
enforcement did not have access to them.  
It seems this process of online radicalization remains relatively consistent and 
begins with increased indoctrination from online sermons by ideologues like Suri and 
Awlaki, progressing to more base and violent videos. ISIS produced no shortage of slick 
propaganda to feed the desire for inspirational and violent content. Additionally, 
prospective lone wolves will likely draw inspiration and support from like-minded 
individuals within internet chat rooms, but this is not unique to jihadists. Current trends 
indicate that other violent fringe movements operate in the same way. The online 
community provides a dangerous level of relative anonymity which inspires people to 
comment and discuss ideas and opinions they might otherwise not. As the process 
continues, confidence, delusion, and disillusionment grow. 
 
89 Raffaello Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist 
Terrorists” (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), March 2011), 34, https://icsr.info/
wp-content/uploads/2011/04/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf. 
39 
B. FIRST OR SECOND-GENERATION IMMIGRANT 
There is ample evidence that this is the demographic stochastic terrorists actively 
target—and which, in turn, is most susceptible to their message. Recent Muslim 
immigrants may seek out belonging, absent a sense of connection to their home and culture 
as result of perceived “ambient racism.”90  Terrorist organizations then capitalize on this 
lack of, and desire for, identity. ISIS’s recruiting, for example, aims to divide vulnerable 
young men from often-tenuous societal ties with the promise of an Islamic utopia. Now, 
since the caliphate’s collapse, they are more often encouraged to stay in the West and attack 
soft targets there.  
Olivier Roy has written extensively on this phenomenon, specifically within 
Europe. “All of these preachers and organizations target second generation Muslims, 
explicitly playing on their sense of being victims of racism, exclusion and loneliness in the 
West.”91 This seems to be both an issue of identity and assimilation and is certainly not 
confined to Europe. Roy continues, “[m]any whether settled in the West or studying there, 
became born-again Muslims and turned politically radical soon after.”92  Again, we 
observe this aspect in all four case studies.  
Bouhlel was a Tunisian immigrant from France. Hasan was born in the United 
States to Palestinian parents. Neither were raised particularly religious. Nor was Omar 
Mateen, whose parents were Afghan emigrants to America. Syed Farook was second 
generation born to Pakistani parents, while his wife, Tashfeen Malik was born in Pakistan 
and spent most of her life there and in Saudi Arabia. Much like engrossment in radical 
online messaging, there seems to be significant correlation between this demographic and 
increased risk for radicalization, as Roy has noted. Actual discrimination surely plays a 
part, but it seems far more likely that it is the perception of injustice and relative inequality 
that are the primary factors which are easily exploited by stochastic terrorists. Susceptible 
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actors may then inevitably seek a sense of purpose, community, and belonging by retreating 
further into their faith, a radicalized cyber-community, or their own minds.  
C. REDUCTION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS / FINANCES 
Much as it is a warning sign for suicide, the giving away of possessions and/or 
money before a lone wolf attack appears commonplace. Most Islamist lone wolves do not 
intend, nor expect to survive the attack. All our case studies resulted in the attacker’s death 
at the hand of law enforcement except for Nidal Hasan, who was admittedly disappointed 
he was not killed, but rather paralyzed from a gunshot wound to the spine. In every case 
the attacker(s) engaged in a firefight with police, in essence attempting suicide by cop. 
Likewise, in every case, the perpetrators transferred significant assets in the days and weeks 
leading up to the attack. 
Adam Lankford contends that suicidal motives and life indifference are traits 
common to both mass shooters and suicide terrorists.93  The challenge then becomes 
assigning indicators which signify these traits. Most Islamist lone wolves fall into the “cult 
of martyrdom” camp which honors and glorifies death (there remains significant debate 
regarding the characterization of these actors as suicidal), but evidence indicates that even 
individuals preparing for this type of death will make certain preparations. The giving away 
of possessions or making arrangements for the welfare of loved ones is principal among 
them.94  
Farook transferred $10K to his mother shortly before the attack in San Bernardino, 
and Bouhlel conveyed his life’s savings (£84,000) to his family in Tunisia, while Mateen 
signed over his share of a house to his sister (for $10).95  Hasan, ever the traditionalist, 
began donating 75% of his income to Islamic charities, but perhaps more telling was that 
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upon arrival to Fort Hood he had so diminished his personal belongings that he basically 
lived in an empty apartment. Hindsight informs us that none of these were simple acts of 
generosity, but rather the actions of terrorists committed to die.   
D. AFFINITY WITH EXTREMIST GROUP(S) 
The vocalization of support for extremist groups is one of the most telling signs of 
burgeoning radicalization. This is in concert with Hamm and Spaaij’s radicalization model 
(Table 1), in fact “[o]ne of Spaaij’s essential findings is that lone wolf terrorists draw on 
beliefs and ideologies of validation generated and transmitted by extremist movements. 
This facet of radicalization was measured by the lone wolf’s affinity with an extremist 
group.”96  Unfortunately, this aspect, though often noted, seems to be regularly ignored by 
family, and in at least two cases mis-evaluated by law enforcement. The affinity for 
extremist groups is present to varying degrees in each of the cases studied and was rarely 
subtle. 
Nidal Hasan was alarmingly open regarding his support for anti-coalition 
insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as his defense of suicide bombers and 
belief in a wider U.S. war directed against Muslims. Unfortunately, Hasan’s superiors, 
likely acting from a misguided sense of political correctness turned a blind eye to his 
assertions. Over a six-month period from 2008–2009, Hasan sent over a dozen emails to 
Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. These exchanges put Hasan on the FBI’s radar, but the Bureau 
did not identify him as an imminent threat and failed to investigate further, possibly due to 
Hasan’s status as a military officer. Likewise, Omar Mateen from an early age claimed 
connection to numerous (and often competing) extremist groups and was chastised at 
school for celebrating the 9/11 attacks. Mateen was investigated by the FBI, and like Hasan 
was also deemed not to be an imminent threat. Ultimately Mateen would pledge allegiance 
to ISIS in the midst of his Orlando rampage. 
The other two case studies are less conclusive. There is no concrete evidence that 
Malik or Farook showed affinity for any particular extremist group, but there is ample 
 
96 Hamm and Spaaij, The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 150–51. 
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evidence to infer their support for jihadist groups writ large. Farook’s father stated his son 
shared the ideology of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and ISIS did claim that he and Malik were 
“soldiers of the caliphate” post attack, which although anecdotal, does suggest a 
connection. Likewise, relatives of Mohamad Lahouaiej-Bouhlel commented on his support 
for ISIS. Bouhlel’s support for extremist groups also manifested itself in the screening of 
violent ISIS videos with his associates. In both cases there was clearly some level of 
preemptive familial recognition of radicalization and affinity, however neither Malik and 
Farook, nor Bouhlel ever overtly claimed allegiance to a specific group or organization 
while alive.  
E. RAPID SHIFT IN BELIEFS / MOSQUE ATTENDANCE 
Individuals in our target demographic displayed a sudden and extreme shift in their 
religious beliefs and/or practices. Olivier Roy also notes this trend regarding radicalization 
of jihadis in general. According to Roy, regardless of religiosity prior to radicalization, 
most displayed this rapid shift. In fact, the majority of jihadis were altogether irreligious, 
often involved in drugs, alcohol, sexual escapades, and other Western vices.97  Many, it 
seems, attempted to “make up for lost time” through fanatical devoutness. In 75 percent of 
the cases we analyzed, the individuals were raised secular. Then as the result of a traumatic 
life event or perception of personal or group persecution, radicalized quickly and severely. 
In fact, all but Farook and Malik were raised in relatively secular families, and because of 
this, their change was marked and obvious. But even Farook and Malik displayed 
behavioral anomalies regarding their patterns of mosque attendance.  
When Nidal Hasan found religion, he dove all-in. Due to the circumstances which 
led him back to religion (his mother’s death and lack of social network), Islam became the 
all-engrossing dominant force in his life. He rapidly became excessively argumentative and 
dismissive of dissenting opinions and beliefs. His aggressive proselytizing and need to 
weave religious themes into all conversations were also a matter of concern. Both his 
colleagues at Walter Reed and his family members noted how Hasan could not and would 
 
97 Roy, Globalized Islam, 310–11. 
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not have a conversation without integrating radical religious themes. Additionally, he 
sought opportunities and forums to espouse his radical views at wildly inappropriate times. 
Convinced the United States was prosecuting an unlawful war against Islam, Hasan 
publicly praised suicide bombers and argued that Shari’a superseded the U.S. constitution 
and all other secular laws. 
Although an exact date cannot be determined, it is clear that Bouhlel radicalized 
over a period of months or weeks as opposed to years. He too was raised secular and lived 
as such for most of his life. He drank alcohol, ate pork, and had many sexual partners. This 
changed as Bouhlel also attempted to make up for lost time by becoming hyper-devout. 
According to one profiler of Bouhlel: “[i]n the time leading up to the act, he began to 
abstain from alcohol, women and salsa dancing, growing a beard and making remarks in 
favor of ISIS.”98  It is also alleged that Bouhlel only began visiting a mosque regularly 
three months prior to the attack.  
Omar Mateen and Bouhlel, who also shared patterns of domestic violence and 
homosexuality, also became decidedly more vocal about their beliefs in their final weeks 
of life. Leading up to the Pulse nightclub attack, Mateen’s mosque attendance actually 
waned, though he compensated with increased consumption of jihadist literature, 
propaganda, and rhetoric, while stating his desire to become a “martyr.”99  Thus, while the 
obvious indicator in most cases is a rapid shift towards extremist and hardline Islamic 
views, a better and more generic indicator may just be this “anomaly detection.”  Likewise, 
Farook, who had regularly prayed and attended mosque services, allegedly stopped 
attending mosque altogether when he married Malik and their radicalization progressed 
covertly behind closed doors. In each of the cases studied, family and friends, with the 
advantage of hindsight were able to identify this anomalous behavior, but in the moment 
failed to recognize this warning sign as such.  
 
98 Jean-Pierre Bouchard, “Profile of the perpetrator of the Nice terror attack that took place on 14th 
July 2016: A terrorist whose modus operandi may have been imitated in other European attacks” (Elsevier 
Masson SAS, 2018), 608. 
99 Lankford, “Identifying Potential Mass Shooters and Suicide Terrorists With Warning Signs of 
Suicide, Perceived Victimization, and Desires for Attention or Fame,” 478. 
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F. WITHDRAWAL FROM, OR ABSENCE OF, FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND 
ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
In three of four cases studied (Malik and Farook being the exception), as 
radicalization progressed, outside relationships were either strained or absent, and often 
intentionally so. Two cases were marked by domestic violence and volatility, as previously 
noted, and collectively the group suffered from an inability to either create or sustain 
positive social, familial, and/or romantic relationships. Although Hasan never enjoyed such 
relationships to begin with, he, Mateen, and Bouhlel all displayed a combination of social 
awkwardness, antisocial behavior, resignation, and aggression. This was especially true 
regarding others who held opposing beliefs.  
Hasan, always an introvert, became aggressively antisocial as he radicalized. 
Following the trauma of his mother’s death, he withdrew further from both society and 
family. He was never known to have any form of intimate or sexual relationship, nor did 
he have any discernable friendships. Additionally, Hasan lost interest in his medical 
professional development in favor of the independent religious study that consumed his 
life. 
Omar Mateen, likewise, alienated his family and had no discernable friends, though 
he was twice married. His first marriage ended after four months amidst allegations of 
physical and emotional abuse. The second lasted longer, but not by much—the couple 
separated following four years, again marked by patterns of domestic abuse. In 2016, the 
year of the Pulse attack, Mateen’s Imam remarked he had become noticeably more isolated 
and “reclusive.”  Also, like Bouhlel, the question of Mateen’s sexuality looms large over 
his personal and emotional conflicts. 
Bouhlel withdrew from his immediate family at an early age, culminating in his 
emigration to France. Regardless of location his violent outbursts created fear and 
animosity within his family unit. When he did marry, his violence and erratic behavior 
estranged him from his wife and children. Though he did have “friends” they were 
predominantly friends of convenience whom he either met at the gym or through work. As 
he increasingly radicalized, he separated himself from those acquaintances and developed 
new friends of convenience based on his evolving interests (radical Islam). Throughout his 
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life, his social contacts were situational, superficial, and manipulative—quite indicative of 
sociopathic tendencies. He did not develop any consistent long-term friendships. Although 
he had numerous sexual liaisons with both men and women, these too were unstable and 
manipulative. In fact, Bouhlel’s confused sexuality is likely one of the major contributing 
factors of his personal guilt.    
G. SEXUALITY (REPRESSION OR GUILT) 
Perhaps one of our more controversial observations is the role of sexuality in the 
radicalization process. Though Sageman contends that sex and terrorism have no 
correlation, we find that assertion to be false.100  Whereas ISIS may have drawn many 
recruits with the promise of sex slaves and wives within the caliphate, there seems to be a 
different dynamic entirely within the lone wolf population. This aspect warrants additional 
study as it is rather nebulous, yet undeniable. There appears to be an element of sexual 
frustration, sexual confusion, repressed sexuality, and/or sexual guilt manifest in the 
population. Certainly, present are instances of repressed homosexuality, which seem to 
play out as guilt, anger, domestic violence and/or hypersexuality. Conversely, much like 
the school shooter demographic, there also exists a population who have difficulty 
interacting with potential sexual partners, which manifests in frustration, rage, and 
perceived persecution. 
Certainly, there are questions regarding the sexual orientation of Bouhlel and 
Mateen. Bouhlel was probably bisexual, having had intimate relationships with both men 
and women. He was referred to as “hyper-sexual,” that is, until he radicalized and seems 
to have attempted to atone for his sins. Mateen, likely a repressed homosexual, possibly 
never acted on his urges, though they would manifest in domestic violence, misogyny, and 
overt homophobia, again, as an over-correction. Both presumably had issues reconciling 
their sexuality with their religion.  
Conversely, Nidal Hasan never had any discernable sexual relationship with 
anyone of either sex. Hasan had an inability to form relationships of any sort. He shares 
 
100 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 62. 
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much in common with the involuntary celibate (INCEL) community. The INCEL 
community has coincidentally been linked with numerous contemporary mass shootings, 
usually targeting groups the shooter blames for their forced celibacy (women, athletes, 
etc.). Malik and Farook possessed a stable heterosexual relationship, making them an 
outlier in this study. 
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VII. EPILOGUE AND PROGNOSIS 
For nearly twenty years the United States has focused the lion’s share of its 
intellectual and military efforts on combatting radical Islam. The issue of terrorism, though 
universal, is far less of an existential threat than the multidimensional challenges posed 
today by both Russia and China—yet the threat posed by Abu Musab al-Suri’s legacy 
persists—manifest in jihad fardi. Although the destruction of ISIS’s physical caliphate has 
rendered the organization less deadly, it is no less dangerous.  
It is likely true that the face of war has changed forever due to advances in 
information technology, and so has the face of modern global jihad. ISIS’s vestige will be 
the durability of its message and ability to inspire Suri’s vision of individual jihad well into 
the future. It is this new face of terrorism with which security practitioners must contend, 
and there is much to learn from the cases analyzed in this study. Each displayed numerous 
indicators, and as we have seen most, if not all were ignored. In a time of increased racial 
tensions, rife with identity politics, this is concerning. For just as we would not desire 
infringement on civil liberties by racial profiling, we must be equally vigilant not to turn a 
blind eye due to political correctness. It is precisely the societal desire within Western 
liberal democracies to be accepting that the stochastic terrorist looks to exploit.  
The unfortunate truth about Nidal Hasan’s attack at Ft. Hood is that it should never 
have happened. Hasan overtly displayed all seven warning signs advanced by this study. 
More damning, as stated in a U.S. Senate investigation report:  
Evidence of Hasan’s radicalization to violent extremism was on full display 
to his superiors and colleagues. An instructor and a colleague each referred 
to Hasan as a ‘ticking time bomb.’ Not only was no action taken to 
discipline or discharge him, but also his Officer Evaluation Reports 
sanitized his obsession with violent Islamic extremism into praiseworthy 
research on counterterrorism.101  
 
101 Joseph I. Lieberman and Susan M. Collins, “A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons 
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One can speculate that Hasan was not disciplined early on due to the sensitive 
political climate within the U.S. military, and it is likely that his superior officers did not 
want to risk being labeled racist, or discriminatory, in an organization that prides itself on 
diversity.  
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel also displayed all seven warning signs. 
Unfortunately, due to fear, apathy, or both, his family, friends, and acquaintances ignored 
them all. As is often the case for those suffering from mental illness, many troubling signs 
were simply written off as symptoms of his troubled mental state. Bouhlel clearly had 
psychological issues from an early age which left him more susceptible to radicalization. 
It is likely he was a sociopath (lacking any capacity for empathy) and suffered from 
borderline personality disorder. He also suffered from a poor body image and low self-
esteem, which he attempted to compensate for with arrogance and an obsession with body 
building. His emotional imbalance and personal insecurities were certainly contributing 
factors as they led to him wanting to matter—to be a martyr.  
Like Bouhlel, Omar Mateen was an angry, sexually confused, mentally troubled 
young man. He also displayed all seven warning signs, and like both Bouhlel and Hasan, 
these were largely ignored by family, friends, and law enforcement. His is a case of a family 
not admitting what is readily apparent before their very eyes. He abused two wives, was 
overtly racist and misogynistic, displayed antisocial tendencies, and had an affinity for 
extremist groups. Also, like the others, Mateen was deeply unhappy and believed that 
“nothing can enlarge a small life like a big death.”102  Unfortunately, no one took him 
seriously. 
Syed Farook survived a troubled childhood to find love and marriage with Tashfeen 
Malik. He had a bachelor’s degree and a good job. Malik successfully emigrated to the 
United States, and with Farook had a daughter. Yet her extremist sympathies were clear to 
those around her, and Farook’s radicalization was clearly noticed by his father, who 
 
102 Jeffrey Kluger, “This Is What Drove the Orlando Killer” (TIME Magazine, June 2016), 
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commented on his affinity for ISIS—posthumously. Collectively, they displayed five of 
seven indicators, which, like the others were unduly ignored.  
Although based on a relatively small amount of case studies, the similarities 
between these cases are striking. The seven proposed indicators provide a useful 
framework for analysis and serve as a cautionary tale regarding the cost of ignorance. 
Perhaps not as defining as the homicidal triad, the indicators should be viewed with the 
same scrutiny as indicators of drug use. The presence of a singular indicator may be rather 
benign, however, when viewed in the aggregate, these indicators should be heeded as 
warning signs of likely radicalization. If ignored, by family, friends, law enforcement, etc., 
it may simply require a tipping point or event, as evinced from the case studies, to propel 
someone to extreme violence. Additional research should be conducted, in accordance with 
this methodology, to analyze every available case of a lone wolf jihadist attack (post 9/11) 
to confirm these findings and refine this thesis. 
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